The Tracks Are There: A Vision Denied

For half a century, Europe and Asia have understood a simple truth: a modern transport system requires balance. Roads for cars, railways for mass movement—each serving its purpose, each relieving the other. This vision existed in Albania before I was born. The old railway network, the "trase" with its layers of inert stone, once connected cities and industries, carrying workers, goods, and hope. The tracks are still there. But instead of building on that foundation, Albania has chosen to pour billions into roads—roads that are crumbling, roads that are under investigation, roads that have become symbols of a deeper failure.

A Legacy of Neglect

The railway tracks themselves are not the problem. The routes exist. The land corridors are intact. The "trase"—the foundation of crushed stone, the embankments, the bridges—is still there. What it needs is reinforcement: new rails, concrete sleepers, modern signaling. This is not starting from zero. This is finishing what was started.

Yet the railway has been starved. While the government's "Rama 4" infrastructure program promises over €800 million for rail and 700 kilometers of new roads, the reality on the ground tells a different story

. The Durrës-Tirana-Rinas line—a project that should have been completed years ago—remains unfinished, its completion now pushed to 2027

. The tracks are ready, but the trains are not running.

Meanwhile, the roads are collapsing.

Chaotic Investment and State Prosecutors

The collapse of the Librazhd-Prrenjas axis in early 2026 was not an isolated incident. It was a symptom of systemic rot. The road, which blocked the southeast of the country for days, is now under investigation by the Elbasan Prosecutor's Office. The maintenance tender, won by a company called InfraKonsult, is being scrutinized for possible criminal offenses including "Abuse of office," "Violation of equality in public tenders," and "Destruction of the road"

. The company is suspected of failing to fulfill its contractual obligations. The road collapsed anyway.

This is not an anomaly. It is a pattern.

In November 2025, the Special Prosecution Office (SPAK) launched an investigation into the Llogara Tunnel and the Tirana Outer Ring Road. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure Belinda Balluku now faces travel bans and suspension from office, accused of "predetermining the outcome of procurement processes" and "granting unjust advantages and privileges" to winning bidders

. The investigation revealed that the Llogara Tunnel was completed before the construction permit was even issued—a permit that only became valid in May 2025, just before the tunnel's inauguration

.

The Qukës-Qafë Plloçë road, inaugurated with drums and folk dances in September 2025, collapsed two months later. The 43-kilometer segment, labeled the "golden road," cost taxpayers nearly $260 million over 15 years. Heavy rain was blamed. But experts point to deeper problems: the absence of proper geological studies, the bypassing of technical councils, the rush to complete projects without proper design

.

"Here they are out of control, they are projects done in a hurry, without technical studies," said engineer Xhevahir Ngjeqari

. Zef Preçi, director of the Center for Economic Studies, described a "clientelist model" of infrastructure spending, where public works are designed to maximize profit rather than serve the public interest

.

The Cost of Corruption

The consequences are measurable. In the first quarter of 2026, capital expenditures from the state budget fell to their lowest level in 17 years—just 53 million euros

. This is not because the money isn't there; the public investment fund is planned at 1.7 billion euros. The money is being lost before it becomes concrete assets.

Investigations have uncovered schemes where the cost per kilometer of road is artificially inflated, contracts are awarded to companies without capacity, and projects drag on for decades

. The incinerator scandal, the ANA file, the Port of Durrës affair—each reveals the same pattern: strategic national assets treated as private property, tenders awarded without competition, and citizens left to bear the cost

.

The Port of Durrës is perhaps the most egregious example. Handed to Mohamed Alabbar's group without a public tender, the project was rushed and flawed. Alabbar himself admitted: "I made a mistake in Albania. I built too quickly"

. Now the existing port is paralyzed, the alternative does not exist, and citizens who paid for apartments in the air face an uncertain future.

A Vision That Existed Before

This was not inevitable. The vision for a balanced transport system—roads and railways working together—existed in Europe and Asia long before I was born. Corridor VIII, the Pan-European transport route linking the Adriatic to the Black Sea, was designed to combine both road and rail. The railway rehabilitation projects, funded by the European Investment Bank, are meant to reduce travel time and shift freight and passengers to sustainable transport

.

But implementation has been a disaster. The Vorë-Durrës segment, part of this corridor, has seen its completion date slip from 2023 to 2027, its cost ballooning from €69.7 million to over €118 million

. The tracks are there, but the political will to finish the job—to do it properly, without corruption, without clientelism—has been missing.

Meanwhile, the government's response to congestion on main streets has been to build more roads. The Tirana-Durrës motorway is being expanded, adding lanes to what is already Albania's busiest corridor

. But adding lanes to a congested highway does not solve congestion; it only invites more cars. The alternative—a modern, electrified railway connecting the capital to the port and the airport—remains unfinished, its completion delayed year after year.

A Shame and a Waste

It is a shame because the foundations are already there. The "trase" is ready. The land corridors are intact. The heavy concrete sleepers and strong iron ties that were once the pride of Albania's railway system could be reinforced and modernized. The hybrid locomotives—like the EuroDual, built by Stadler, capable of switching between electric and diesel power—are exactly the kind of advanced technology that could serve a mixed network

. They could pull passenger cars and freight, reducing emissions, easing congestion, and connecting Albania to European corridors.

But instead of finishing what was started, Albania has chosen to chase the mirage of road-based development, pouring billions into projects that collapse, investigations, and scandals. The state prosecutors are busy, but the problem is not just corruption—it is a lack of vision. The vision that existed in Europe and Asia before I was born, the vision that understood the value of railways, the vision that recognized that alternative infrastructure is the only way to avoid congestion—that vision has been abandoned.

The tracks are there. The foundation is ready. All that is needed is the will to build.